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Property  taxes provide  48 percent of local governmental  revenues
(taxes plus state and federal aid) nation wide.  They are local govern-
ment's  primary  source  of revenue.  The real  property tax  has been
and continues  to be the  basic source of local revenue.  Furthermore,
of all local government expenditures,  37 percent  go to elementary
and secondary  schools (U.S. Department  of Commerce,  1993,  p.  45).
The  cost of educating  our nation's youth has increased  significantly
and rapidly  in the past  10  years (Figure  1).  The responsibility  for
paying for these increased  costs often falls to  local governments  and
citizens.  Problems with property tax, therefore,  become  problems of
school finance.  These issues trouble a number of researchers,  policy
makers  and extension  educators.  Our efforts  in this session are to
touch  some of the concerns.  While it is not possible  to address  all as-
pects  of school  and  local  government  finance,  perhaps  a few  of the
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153basic  facts and  problems  of the real property  tax can  be discussed.
Then  we can examine  some  possible areas  for change  in finance
mechanisms.  While  we  cannot examine  all  issues,  we  focus  on  two
questions:  school finance  and property tax  administration.  Let's see
what some  of our colleagues  are saying and considering.
Nationally,  the real property tax constitutes three-fourths  of the
tax revenue  raised by local governments.  According to the U.S.  De-
partment of Commerce,  in  1991,  local governments  got  $161.8  billion
of their $339.9 billion  of general revenue  from  own sources  (1993,  p.
2).  Of that general revenue  from own sources,  63 percent  is taxes
and the  remainder  fees  and  charges.  Of these  local  government
taxes,  75  percent  are property  taxes (Table  1).  And  of the property
tax revenue,  about 90  percent  is  from real property  (Table  1) (U.S.
Department of Commerce,  1989,  p.  7).
The  real property tax  is based on the  real estate's long-run value
and may be high or low in relation to any particular year's earnings.
The  market  value of real  estate  is  net earnings  capitalized  at  some
appropriate rate of interest.  Since net earnings are earnings  after
taxes,  the value  of the capitalized  tax represents  a public value  over
and  above  market  value.  For example,  a value  of $2  trillion from
capitalizing  the  1987  real property tax  of $105  billion at 5  percent
might be added  to the $12  trillion of U.S.  land and structures esti-
mated for  1987 by the National Realty Committee.  The combined  $14
trillion value might be termed  the national asset value  of real estate
(National Realty Committee,  pp.  2,  96).
Farmland  values,  too,  have a  private  and  a public  dimension.  In
1993,  the market value of farm real estate was $685  billion (U.S.  De-
partment  of Agriculture;  Shoemaker).  If the  comparable  year's  tax
of $4.9  billion were  capitalized  at 5  percent,  for example,  the  public
interest  via the real  property  tax would be  $98  billion (Gertel).  The
national asset value  of farm real estate  of $783  billion represents the
true productive value of the land and the $685 billion is the private or
market share  of the real  estate.  If the tax  were raised to  $6  billion,
the market value of the real estate would drop to $663  billion.  The
value  of the  land would  not  change,  but the  lower  market  price
would  reflect the higher tax.
Similarly,  if the real property  tax is reduced  by exempting part  or
all  of the value  from taxation,  for example,  the market  price of the
exempted property will increase.  Decreases or increases  in the taxes
on land can create windfalls or wipeouts  for the property owners,
but they do not change the  underlying value of the land.  Changes  in
the tax only change the distribution of value between  the public  and
the private landowners.  All the redistributive  advantage  of preferen-
tial assessment of farmland  went to the owners  of the farmland at
the time the various  laws  of the  1970s were implemented.  All subse-
quent purchasers  simply paid a  higher market price  for their farm-
land in exchange  for lower taxes.
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.4 a) a)Other  distributions  between  the public  and private interests  in
land include  regulations that limit land use  options.  The regulations
could take the form of a tax or, by enhancing  the attractiveness  of a
neighborhood,  a  subsidy.  Government  may  rent land  for  desired
purposes,  as  in the Conservation  Reserve  Program (CRP),  or  it may
buy  land for roads  or utilities,  or  purchase easements  for particular
purposes.  Except  as government  intervenes  to  change  basic  supply
or  demand  features  of land,  taxes  and subsidies  do not change  the
underlying  value  of land,  only  the  distribution  of interests  between
the  public  and  private  landowners.  The  preferential  assessment  of
farm,  open  space,  and  forest lands  represents  a  nearly universal
program subsidy  by local government to landowners.
Preferential Assessment  Favors Farmland
Since  the  early  seventies,  fifty  states  have  modified  their  real
property  tax  laws  to encourage  using land  for  agriculture,  open
space and forestry.  Provisions of state tax laws vary widely, but they
commonly appraise  and assess in terms of current use rather than a
market value that takes into account projected  future uses. Farm-
land is  valued  as farmland  rather than future residential  homesites.
Land use  assessment  is intended  to align the annual tax payment
with the current annual earning capacity of the land,  rather than the
value  of land as an asset (Aiken;  Malme).
Rationales  for  subsidizing  agriculture,  open  space  and  forestry
through  preferential  tax assessment  vary  widely.  One  argument
cites  lower levels  of public  services  associated with  low-density  set-
tlement.  Low-density  agriculture  and forestry  mean fewer  school
children.  Even at  higher  per capita  costs,  the  total costs  for educa-
tion may be lower in communities  with low-density residential  devel-
opment.  Through the eyes of the public  fisc,  agriculture,  industry
and commerce  earn, but babies and school children  cost.
A  precise  estimate  of how much  subsidy  owner/taxpayers  receive
through  preferential  assessment  of their farmland  may  be incalcua-
ble,  given  the  detailed  laws  of fifty  states.  Minnesota  requires  that
the  taxpayer receive  one-third  of his/her  family  income from  the
land  to  receive  the  preferential  assessment.  Wisconsin  allows
qualifiers  to  deduct  their property  tax  from  the  state  income  tax  to
such an extent taxpayers may get a refund.  In those states that have
used the real property  tax  for  social  engineering,  the calculation  of
the subsidy  equivalent  of preferential  assessment  is difficult  (Ander-
son;  Michos).
A  partial  estimate  of the subsidy  equivalent  of the preferential
assessment  of the  real property tax  may be derived  from data  ac-
quired by the  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  (USDA)  in its annual
survey of local tax officials.  For example,  the  difference  in per-acre
tax  rates for farmland with and without a preferential assessment
156was  5  percent and  6  percent,  respectively,  in  1991  and  1992,  the
latest years for which data were collected.  Those percentages  trans-
late  into  subsidy  equivalents  of $237.2  million  and $292.1  million  for
the two years.
By  reading,  in that  same  USDA survey,  changes  in tax levies  for
parcels  going on  or  off of preferential  assessment,  one  gets  another
perspective.  Levies on farmland  parcels  with preferential  assess-
ment in 1991  and without  in 1992 increased  17 percent  over  1991.
However,  levies on farmland parcels without preference  in  1991 and
with preference  in  1992  dropped 33  percent.  These findings suggest
that the revenue  losses by new entries in preferential  assessment
are greater than the  revenue gained  by lands  leaving the  preferen-
tial  assessment.
Does preferential  assessment  preserve  agricultural, open space  or
forest land  use?  According  to  Malme,  "There  is  general  consensus
from extensive  research over a twenty-year period that the econom-
ic incentive  offered  by  lower property taxes  has had minimal  effect
in preventing  conversion  of farmland  to  more intensive  uses"  (Mal-
me,  p.  22).  In nineteen  states there  is no rollback  feature  to  "penal-
ize"  the conversion  of land.  In other states the rollback feature  is
nominal, forming little disincentive  to convert to other uses when it is
otherwise  profitable.  Wunderlich  estimated  that eliminating the  eco-
nomic  competition  from  nonagricultural  forces  on  the value  of agri-
cultural land would  require a  subsidy of more than twice  the entire
real property  tax paid  on  agricultural  land.  Real property  taxes,  to
be an  effective  land-use  policy  instrument,  should  approximate  the
incremental value of a land-use conversion.
A Fair Tax When Administered Evenly
Policymakers  may view taxes as sources of revenue, incentives for
resource  use and  mechanisms  for welfare.  Taxpayers,  for any  par-
ticular tax, however,  are interested primarily in equitable treatment.
An equitable  real property tax assesses the same rates on equivalent
properties,  but  the  effective  distribution  of the real  property tax  is
uneven.  Taxes per acre vary widely among states  (Figures 2  & 3).
Such variations are the result  of differing  levels  of services  de-
manded by citizens in different  regions of the country, differences  in
efficiency  of governments  in providing  the services,  and differences
in the  bases  of taxes  and  other  fees,  charges  and  revenues.  Within
the states, taxes on individual parcels  will vary with the various par-
cels'  quality  and  use value.  Such  differences,  however,  do not gen-
erally relate to the fairness or equitability of the tax.
The  unevenness  that bears  on fairness relates  to  equality  of bur-
den of taxes.  In an ad valorem real property tax,  equality of burden
means that government  takes the same  share of value  from all prop-
erties.  If the government takes a larger share  of value from large-
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158valued properties,  the tax is progressive.  If the government  takes a
smaller  share  of large-valued  properties,  the tax is  regressive.  The
bar chart based on data from a landownership  follow-on  of the  Cen-
sus of Agriculture (U.S. Department of Commerce,  1988) suggests an
overall  regressivity  in effective  real property  tax rates in the United
States (Figure 4).  Similar regressivity was found in an overwhelming
majority of state farmland tax rates (Figure 3).
Conceptually,  the ad valorem real property tax is  neither progres-
sive nor regessive, but neutral.  However,  as Figures 4 &  5 show, the
rate  of real property  tax  in dollars  per  $100  of value  for the largest
landholdings  is  about one- third that of the  smallest landholdings.
Analysis  reveals that very little  of the apparent regressiveness  is due
to  a  "state  effect."  Furthermore,  Wunderlich  and Blackledge  found
steep regressiveness  in all but four slightly progressive  states and
five  neutral  or  slightly regressive  states.  Explanations  based  on
owner  characteristics  such  as  age,  race,  residence  and  occupation
are both intuitively and statistically inadequate.
By elimination,  Wunderlich  and  Blackledge tentatively  concluded
that regressiveness  is due primarily to  the administration  of the tax,
perhaps the assessment  process.  The  findings mean that large-
valued properties  are  systematically  under-valued  relative  to  small-
Figure 4.  Real Property Taxes Per $100  of Value,  1988
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-Figure 5. Real Property Taxes  Per Acre,  1988
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valued properties.  If, for example,  the farmland  owners in that class
of holdings  valued  at $5  million  or more were to pay taxes  at the
overall average  rate, their total taxes would  increase from  $264  mil-
lion to $477 million, or from about 5 percent to 9 percent of the  $5  bil-
lion real property taxes on U.S.  farmland.  Potentially,  local govern-
ment  revenues  could  increase,  small  holder's  tax  bills  could
decrease,  or both.
The effective  rate of taxation, and  the factors affecting  the rate,
can only be determined with careful study within the environment  of
each state's laws and administration.  The assessment and taxing as a
process has potential for generating much  of the information  needed
for its own evaluation.  That  information  should  be organized  and
used.
The Real  Property Tax Can Be Improved
An improved  property tax system,  while  unlikely  to solve  all K-12
education  finance  problems,  could  contribute  to  education  finance
while providing other public services. Economically,  the land tax has
much going for it.  To the  extent that the quantity of land  is unaltera-
ble except by the application  of labor and capital, supply  is inelastic.
Rent is pure. A tax on land, therefore,  has little  effect on the level of
160its use.  Paul Samuelson,  in  his  classic economics  text, wrote,  "Pure
land rent is  the nature  of a  'surplus'  which can be taxed  heavily
without distorting  production  incentives  or  efficiency"  (Samuelson,
p.  541).  By the same reasoning,  a tax  on labor may deter workers
from  working as hard or long,  and a tax on capital may lower the
rate  of capital  formation.  Income,  value-added,  and  sales taxes are
more  likely to cause economic  inefficiences  than taxes  on land rents
or values.  The first improvement  in the tax system  should be  to re-
place taxes on labor and capital with taxes on land, where possible.
One argument  for maintaining  or increasing the shares  of reve-
nues raised locally is the autonomy and control over budget and pro-
grams,  such as  schools,  it allows local jurisdictions  to retain.  Raising
funds locally also may encourage  fiscal discipline  and greater  citizen
involvement,  since the real property tax is directly related to the re-
sources of the community.
Clearly, the real property tax will not yield revenue sufficient  to
accommodate  all the  services  of local government,  so  other  sources
of revenue are necessary.  However, the real property tax can be im-
proved  while  remaining  an  important  source  of revenue.  Here  are
some  of the  ways  a real property  tax can be  modified  to make  it
more acceptable  if more revenue must be raised:
* Levy taxes on property  in proportion  to value.  The  presumption
of equitability of the ad valorem tax is that land of comparable
value  will be taxed at the  same  rate whether in large or small
quantities.  The ad valorem tax is  neutral in concept,  neither pro-
gressive nor regressive, but deviations apparently occur.
* Eliminate  exemptions  to reduce  the  complexity  of assessment
and computation  of levies as  well as broaden  the tax base.  In  its
Census  of Governments,  the U.S.  Department of Commerce
identified  major  categories  of land owners  completely  exempted
from tax in eighteen states and a wide range of partial exemp-
tions  in  thirty-one  states.  Nongovernment  property  exemptions
result in more than 7 percent of the assessed value  of nongovern-
ment property standing untaxed (Behrens).
* Assess land and capital improvements  separately  and shift the
tax toward  land  and away  from improvements  to  provide incen-
tive  to owners.  The  shift from improvements  to  land can  be
achieved without  individual  tax increases. If,  as recent studies
show,  buildings  represent  about  one-fifth  of  farm  real  estate
values  (Canning),  an increase  in land taxes should permit a five-
fold reduction in building taxes  with no loss in revenue.
* Appraise  and assess at  100 percent of market value  so the assess-
ing process  is clearer to the taxpayer and calculations  are not un-
necessarily  complicated  (Behrens).  Some state  constitutions  will
need amending.
161* Reduce the number  of classes and categories of land for differen-
tial  assessment  or rates.  Adherence  to  100  percent of market
value precludes special classes of land.
* Eliminate  caps,  circuit breakers,  senior preferences  and  other
forms of social engineering  through the real property tax system.
Provide the holders of substantial landholdings  but low annual
returns, the option of paying taxes with equity claims.
* Incorporate  appraisal  and assessment activities  into a compre-
hensive  geographic  information  system.  Further,  adopt  com-
puter-  assisted  mass  appraisal  to  provide  annual  reassessments
and  improve the  quality of land information  available  to  office
and citizen.  Examine  the possibility  of self-assessment  in  the ad-
ministration of property taxes.
For farmland,  the  preferential-land-use  assessment  is controver-
sial.  If only  land,  not buildings,  is assessed  at present (agricultural)
use,  the  burden  of tax is shifted  from land  to  buildings  and building
improvements  are discouraged.  But building  and maintaining  farm
buildings  might be the strongest incentive  to  preserve  farming.  And
preferential  assessments  without  full value  rollbacks  actually  en-
courage  speculating  with farmland  for capital gains.  America  has
more than two decades of experience  with land- use value assess-
ment, and reexamination, possibly reform,  is in order.
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